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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Special Topic's lead Article, I claimed that it matters
when statutory rights are adjudicated by an arbitrator rather than by
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") because
of the different ways in which disputes are framed and argued in the
two forums.' In arbitration, it is accepted that disputes are bounded
by the parties' agreement and the expectations that arise from their
past practices. 2 The statutory framework governing collective bar-
gaining, however, is treated as a given. The capacity to alter that
structure incrementally through the processing of workplace disputes
in an arbitral forum is limited.3 The student Comments in this Spe-
cial Topics issue examined specific topics that illustrate the tension
between a model of labor relations that embraces private ordering as
the predominant policy and a model that seeks to foster statutory pol-
icies in addition to private ordering by preserving the ability of unions
and individual employees to vindicate their statutory rights through
access to the NLRB and the courts. This Essay focuses on how the
findings of each Comment demonstrate the extent to which increased
* Dennis 0. Lynch is a Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law.
1. See Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to
Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 327-34 (1989).
2. Id. at 327-29.
3. Id. at 327-31.
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reliance on arbitration tends to submerge the significance of statutory
policies other than that of private ordering.
Five of the student Comments published in this issue are case
studies that compare the reasoning of arbitrators with the reasoning
of the NLRB and the courts.' Specifically, two Comments deal with
employer entitlements, 5 two with employee statutory entitlements
under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or
4. See Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting After Milwaukee Spring II: Much
Ado About Nothing?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Arbitral
Treatment of Subcontracting]; Comment, Arbitration and Selective Discipline of Union Officials
After Metropolitan Edison, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Selective
Discipline]; Comment, The Differing Nature of the Weingarten Right to Union Representation
in the NLRB and Arbitral Forums, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 467 (1989) [hereinafter Comment,
Weingarten Right]; Comment, Employee Drug Testing: Federal Courts Are Redefining
Individual Rights of Privacy, Will Labor Arbitrators Follow Suit?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489
(1989) [hereinafter Comment, Drug Testing]; Comment, Successorship Doctrine, the Courts and
Arbitrators. Common Sense or Dollars and Cents?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Successorship Doctrine].
5. For a description of the classification of statutory limits on employer discretion under
the NLRA as entitlements, see Lynch, supra note 1, at 271-94. An employer's decision to sell
a business is classified as permissive under the Supreme Court's test for distinguishing
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, and it is thus an employer entitlement not
limited by a bargaining obligation. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,
686 (1981) ("[The harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding
whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the
incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in making the
decision ...."); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965)
(Referring to an employer's decision to terminate its business, the Court stated that such
decisions are "so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would never
constitute violations" of Section 8(a)(1).).
The doctrine governing the employer's entitlement to subcontract is more complex. An
employer's decision to subcontract has traditionally been regarded as a mandatory subject of
bargaining. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964). Under
the Board's application of the First National Maintenance test, a decision to transfer work or to
subcontract work may not be a mandatory subject of bargaining if it turns on the nature and
direction of the business rather than on labor costs. See Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891,
893-94 (1984) (plurality opinion) (Otis Elevator 11), rev'g 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981) (Otis
Elevator I). For a more complete treatment of the NLRB's test for a mandatory subject of
bargaining, see Lynch, supra note 1, at 277 n.225. Even in a situation where an employer does
have a statutory duty to bargain, the employer may unilaterally act subsequent to impasse
without violating the NLRA, unless the employer is explicitly constrained by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268
N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), rev'g 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee Spring
I). For a discussion of the way in which arbitrators define good faith limits on the scope of an
employer's entitlement, see Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 4, at
386-89.
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"Act"),6 and one with what can be labeled an unsettled entitlement.7
The Comments compare the treatment of the entitlements in public
forums with the treatment accorded by arbitrators who are con-
fronted with similar disputes. In this Essay, I will focus on the stu-
dents' findings regarding the way in which disputes are framed and
argued in arbitration in each of the five areas and the implications of
their findings for the protection of statutory values implicated in the
disputes resolved through arbitration.
The two remaining Comments analyze doctrinal developments
which parallel the principal themes of my earlier Article in this Spe-
cial Topic.8 For example, one of these Comments deals with the ten-
sion between collective and individual control over Section 7 rights,
focusing in part on deferral to grievance settlements rather than defer-
ral to arbitrators' awards. The other Comment describes recent doc-
trinal trends under the Railway Labor Act (RLA),9 trends which
alter the classification of disputes as "major" or "minor" and thereby
cause increased referral to arbitrators of disputes involving questions
of statutory policy. The classification of a dispute as "minor," requir-
ing the dispute to be resolved through arbitration, has an impact
under the RLA similar to the consequences of the deferral doctrine
under the NLRA. The latter two Comments are discussed first, fol-
lowed by a brief analysis of the other five Comments' findings regard-
ing arbitral treatment of employer, employee, and unsettled
entitlements.
6. Union leaders may not be differentially sanctioned for engaging in protected activity
unless a collective bargaining agreement so provides. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693, 710 (1983); Comment, Selective Discipline, supra note 4. Moreover, Section 7
protects an employee's right to have a union representative present at an investigatory
interview that the employee reasonably believes might lead to discipline. See NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975); Prudential Ins. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 208 (1985)
(Weingarten right may be waived by a union); Comment, Weingarten Right, supra note 4.
7. Drug testing is an unsettled entitlement in the sense that our societal values regarding
the appropriate balance between employee privacy and a drug free workplace are currently
being defined simultaneously through constitutional litigation, state and federal legislation,
collective bargaining, and arbitration. See Comment, Drug Testing, supra note 4.
8. See Comment, Distinguishing Arbitration and Private Settlement in NLRB Deferral
Policy, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Deferral Policy]; Comment,
Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern Air Lines: Can It Fly?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539
(1989) [hereinafter Comment, Eastern Air Lines].
9. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577-80, 582, 584-87 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
188 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (RLA).
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II. THE FRAGMENTATION OF DISPUTE PROCESSING
UNDER THE RLA
Eastern Air Lines 'I begins by analyzing how deregulation of the
airline industry led to increased competion among carriers. 1' In order
to reduce costs in the face of growing competition, airlines began to
seek concessions from unions when collective bargaining agreements
expired.12 As a result, the practical impact of an employer's obliga-
tion to maintain the status quo changed. Prior to concession bargain-
ing, the status quo obligation meant that the costs of wages and
benefits during bargaining were less than what the employees would
be earning once there was an agreement on a new contract.13 With
the advent of concession bargaining, employees were being paid more
during bargaining than they could expect to earn once there was an
agreement on a new contract. 14 Consequently, unions acquired a
vested interest in prolonged bargaining. Delays in a declaration of
impasse by the National Mediation Board, a declaration which would
free management to implement concessions unilaterally, tended to
strengthen the bargaining power of unions rather than that of
employers. 15
The Eastern Air Lines Comment further described the way in
which courts responded to this change in the economic environment
of the airline industry by expanding the category of "minor" disputes,
which are not subject to the statutory status quo obligation, and by
shrinking the scope of "major" disputes which are subject to the obli-
gation.' 6 The decisions emphasize a contractarian image in which
parties define workplace entitlements in the shadow of the law, with
neutral courts enforcing the terms of private agreements interpreted
by arbitrators.' 7 When disputes over unilateral changes in working
conditions are addressed in arbitration rather than in courts, statutory
policies concerned with the balance of power in bargaining drop to
the background. The freedom of management to respond to product
10. Comment, Eastern Air Lines, supra note 8.
11. See id. at 549-53, 567-68.
12. See id. at 552-53.
13. See id. at 567-68.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See RLA §§ 3-6, 10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-156, 160. For a description of the "major"
dispute procedures under the RLA, see Comment, Eastern Air Lines, supra note 8, at 557
n. 117. For a discussion of status quo obligations, see id. at 559 nn. 125-28 and accompanying
text.
17. The term arbitrator is used here to refer to the neutral party who sits with the systems
board of an air carrier or the adjustment board of a railroad. See Comment, Eastern Air Lines,
supra note 8, at 565 n.171.
[Vol. 44:617
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market changes by altering working conditions-both during the bar-
gaining stages of new agreements and during the terms of existing
agreements-is determined by reference to parties' expectations based
on past practices and current or former collective bargaining agree-
ments, and not by reference to statutory policies concerned with
maintaining the union's voice in workplace decisions and the existing
balance of bargaining power during negotiations. 8
This shift in the doctrinal classification of disputes under the
RLA has a number of consequences similar to the increased reliance
on deferral and waiver doctrines under the NLRA. 19 First, because of
the "obey and grieve" doctrine in arbitration, management enjoys
more flexibility to act unilaterally pending resolution of minor dis-
putes than would be the case if the disputes were classified as major.2"
The possibility of an adverse arbitration ruling in a minor dispute pro-
vides some deterrence, but a union is likely to need specific contract
language restricting employer action to win in arbitration.2" In addi-
tion, an employer's actions prior to an arbitral award may so alter the
underlying circumstances that an arbitrator will be unable or unwill-
ing to grant a remedy that would deter similar breaches in the
future.2 2 Finally, courts rarely issue status quo injunctions in minor
disputes under the RLA due to the courts' hesitancy to interfere with
the arbitrator's role as the interpreter of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.23 In order to issue a status quo injunction pending arbitration,
based on a union demonstrating the traditional equitable require-
ments of irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits, a
court will inevitably become involved in contract interpretation. Con-
sequently, management is relatively free to make changes in working
conditions pending arbitration of a minor dispute under the RLA, just
18. See, e.g., Comment, Eastern Air Lines, supra note 8, at 557-83 (describing the court's
opinion in Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough H)).
19. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 296-98 nn.312-27.
20. See Comment, Eastern Air Lines, supra note 8, at 563-65.
21. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584,
2592-93 (1989) (Rejecting the Third Circuit's conclusion that a company had a duty to bargain
because the sale of the company would mean a substantial loss in jobs, the Court pointed to the
lack of any specific contract clause limiting management's discretion to sell, and refused to find
an implied limitation in job security guarantees.).
22. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 293-94.
23. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477,
2481 n.5 (1989) (declining to address the unresolved question of a court's power to issue an
injunction pending arbitration under the RLA based on a claim of irreparable injury);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1989)
(insufficient showing of irreparable harm to warrant an injunction).
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as employers governed by the NLRA and Section 301 of the LMRA
are relatively free to make changes pending arbitration.
Second, because disputes will be resolved by reference to the par-
ties' past practices and expectations under current or former agree-
ments, the role of statutory policy is limited to reinforcing private
ordering. A sense of shared workers' rights cutting across bargaining
unit lines is undermined because the processing of disputes concern-
ing those rights is localized within particular bargaining units. Thus,
unions are encouraged to focus their efforts on constraining unilateral
employer decisions through contract negotiations, and they are
discouraged from using litigation to reinforce the structure of the
legal framework governing bargaining in a way that preserves union
bargaining power and protects employee job security during
negotiations.24
These trends are visible in each of the cases involving Eastern Air
Lines. In Air Line Pilots Association v. Eastern Air Lines (Eastern
Furlough II),2" the District of Columbia Circuit defined status quo
obligations under Section 6 by reference to both implied contractual
entitlements under an expired agreement and past practices. 26 The
court could have classified the dispute as major and interpreted the
contract to establish status quo obligations in light of statutory poli-
cies concerned with protecting the existing balance in bargaining
power while allowing employers some latitude in responding to prod-
uct market changes. Instead, the court determined the initial issue of
whether the dispute was minor or major by asking whether the dis-
pute could have been resolved by reference to the agreement and past
practices if the dispute had arisen during the term of agreement. 2
Because it will normally be at least arguable that any mid-term
dispute can be resolved by reference to implied contract terms and
past practices, this reasoning can turn most status quo issues during
Section 6 bargaining into "minor" disputes to be resolved by an arbi-
trator. This result submerges the statutory policies underlying status
quo obligations during bargaining and highlights a policy preference
24. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 290, 324-25.
25. 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Eastern Furlough H).
26. Id. at 898. In Eastern Furlough II, three unions (TWU, IAM and ALPA), sought to
enjoin the decision to close a hub and furlough employees. The TWU agreement was still in
effect, but the IAM agreement and the ALPA agreements had expired. Id. at 897-98. In
rejecting an injunction, the court reasoned that disputes which would have been minor had
they arisen during the term of an agreement should not become major, and thus subject to the
status quo obligations under Section 6 of the RLA, merely because they arise once the parties
are engaged in negotiations over a new agreement. Id. at 898-99; see Comment, Eastern Air
Lines, supra note 8, at 582-83.
27. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 898-900.
[Vol. 44:617
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for private ordering by making management's freedom to act during
bargaining solely a question of contract interpretation for an arbitra-
tor. Thus, in order to decide if the dispute was arbitrable, the court in
Eastern Furlough II interpreted past practice and the agreement as if
the court were an arbitrator and essentially ruled that the contract
permitted Eastern Air Lines to furlough its employees.28 The court
then held that the parties' dispute was "minor" under the RLA and
that the district court was therefore without jurisdiction to enter a
preliminary injunction to block the decision to furlough pending the
parties agreeing on a new agreement or reaching impasse.29 Instead,
the dispute over the furlough of employees was to be resolved under
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement by an arbitrator, even
though the court had virtually predetermined the arbitrator's
award." If this general approach for determining whether a dispute
is "minor" is adopted by other circuits, they will likely limit their
analysis to whether the change in working conditions during Section 6
bargaining is "arguably" justified under the contract, thereby avoid-
ing interference with an arbitrator's province to interpret the agree-
ment. If the change is arguably justified, then courts will refer the
dispute to arbitration with no reference to the merits, thereby leaving
the employer free to act pending arbitration.3
Air Line Pilots Association v. Eastern Air Lines (Eastern Pilots
//)32 is the reverse side of the same coin. Late in the term of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, Eastern Air Lines subcontracted with a
company to train its employees to fly Eastern planes should the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) strike following an impasse in bar-
gaining.33 The dispute went to the heart of the parties' obligations to
maintain the status quo under Section 6: One party sought a strategic
advantage in anticipation of the expiration of the agreement.
Although the agreement contained relatively clear contract language
restricting the employer's discretion to subcontract work covered by
the agreement, the District of Columbia Circuit still classified the dis-
28. Id. at 899-900.
29. Id. at 913.
30. Id. at 899.
31. See, e.g., id. at 926 (Silberman, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
(noting that whether the expired agreement would have authorized the furloughs is an issue for
the system board and not the court). Compare id. with Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Trans. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2484 (1989) (mid-term disputes must go to
arbitrators if they are "arguably" justified by the collective bargaining agreement).
32. 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Eastern Pilots H). For an analysis of the case, see
Comment, Eastern Air Lines, supra note 8, at 569-75.
33. Eastern Pilots II, 869 F.2d at 1519.
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pute as minor because it arose while the agreement was in effect.34
This left Eastern Air Lines free to subcontract pending arbitration
unless the union could obtain a status quo injunction based on a claim
of irreparable harm. Thus, any dispute arising during the term of an
agreement could be referred to arbitration without the issuance of a
status quo injunction, even if the employer's purpose in breaching the
contract was to obtain an advantage during subsequent bargaining
over a new agreement.
The recent Supreme Court opinion in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Railway Labor Executives'Association " does not go as far as the East-
ern Pilots II opinion, but it may have the same pragmatic conse-
quence. In Consolidated Rail, the Court held that all mid-term
disputes are classified as minor if the employer's unilateral action is
"arguably" justified by the terms of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.36 In Consolidated Rail, the employer could only point to
an implied contract term that permitted annual physical examinations
in order to "arguably" justify the unilateral imposition of drug test-
ing.37 On this slim reed, the Court held the dispute to be minor.38
Consequently, it will be a rare case in which management cannot
identify some implied term that makes a disputed issue "arguable."
The sale of Eastern Air Lines' shuttle to Donald Trump39
presents the least interesting of the three Eastern Air Lines law suits
because the district court felt compelled to follow the District of
Columbia Circuit's opinion in Eastern Furlough II 0 The Supreme
Court, however, subsequently decided a similar controversy in Pitts-
burgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives' Associa-
tion.41 In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad, the Supreme Court
explicitly referred to the underlying value of protecting capital mobil-
ity in a market economy as a justification for limiting a court's power
to restrain management's discretion to sell a business pending bar-
gaining under the status quo obligation of Section 6 of the RLA.42
Relying on NLRA precedent,43 the Court held: "Absent statutory
34. Id. at 1524.
35. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
36. Id. at 2482.
37. Id. at 2484-89.
38. Id. at 2489.
39. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 701 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Trump Shuttle).
40. See id. at 879; Comment, Eastern Air Lines, supra note 8, at 588-92.
41. 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989).
42. Id. at 2596.
43. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 270 (1965) ("A
proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would
[Vol. 44:617
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direction to the contrary, the decision of a railroad employer to go out
of business and consequently to reduce to zero the number of avail-
able jobs is not a change in the conditions of employment forbidden
by the status quo provision of § 156." 44 Just as with permissive sub-
jects of bargaining under the NLRA, the only way a union may now
restrain employer action under the RLA in core areas of management
prerogative is by obtaining a clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment specifically prohibiting the type of unilateral change at issue and
enforcing that clause through arbitration.45
When one looks at these RLA opinions as a group, there is a
marked shift from court adjudication of conflicts involving tensions in
statutory policies under the RLA to arbitration of the disputes. In
arbitration, statutory policy plays less of a role in the way in which
disputes are resolved. Management is relatively free to act pending
arbitration while unions are prohibited from striking over a minor
dispute.46 Furthermore, statutory policy is not likely to be preserved
through judicial review of arbitral awards because the scope of judi-
cial review is as limited under the RLA as it is limited under federal
common law.47 In summary, the opinions concerning Eastern Air
Lines fit within the general trend in labor doctrine to emphasize pri-
vate ordering within specific bargaining units as the overriding statu-
tory value.
III. DEFERRAL TO COLLECTIVE CONTROL
OVER SECTION 7 RIGHTS
In Deferral Policy,48 the author concludes that the Board should
alter its current standard for deferral to arbitral awards that involve
disputes over statutory rights and should decline to defer unless
waiver by contract is a central issue, but the author also concludes
that the Board should be more willing to defer to a settlement of the
same dispute by a union and employer, despite the objection of the
affected employees.49 The Comment argues that the two situations
are different because the arbitral award thwarts Congress' intent to
represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest
manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor
Relations Act.")
44. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 109 S. Ct. at 2596.
45. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 276-92.
46. See id. at 279-81 (discussing similar trends under the NLRA).
47. See id. at 268-69 (discussing judicial review of a Delta Airlines arbitral award).
48. Comment, Deferral Policy, supra note 8.
49. Compare id. at 367 (limiting deferral to "those situations in which contractual issues
are dispositive of statutory charges") with id. at 368-69 & nn. 198-200 ("[C]ontroversies settled
during greivance discussions require only a minimal measure of review.").
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have the NLRB decide unfair labor practice charges, but a negotiated
settlement reinforces the type of voluntary adjustment of disputes that
Congress sought to encourage.50 The author concludes that reinforc-
ing negotiated settlements is consistent with a union's power to waive
statutory entitlements as set forth by the Supreme Court in Metropoli-
tan Edison.5
The Comment correctly concludes that deferral to grievance set-
tlements is more a question of the scope of a union's power to waive
individual rights than a conflict over the preferred forum for resolving
claims of statutory entitlements.2 Justice O'Connor's dissenting opin-
ion in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems" aptly presents the central
problem: Should the Board regard a union's decision to refuse to
press a grievance or, alternatively, to settle a grievance over the objec-
tion of the affected employee, as a basis for dismissing an unfair labor
practice charge based on the same underlying facts as the contract
dispute? Most individual employee rights derived from statutes that
are independent of the legal regime governing collective bargaining
cannot be waived by unions.54 The waiver of Section 7 rights under
the NLRA, however, is more complicated because the principal pur-
pose of Section 7 is to protect and strengthen collective action." I
disagree, however, with the Comment's conclusion that the Board
should defer to union and employer settlements involving the Section
7 rights of employees, unless the union breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation in agreeing to settle.
Fair representation doctrine is primarily a doctrine that sets lim-
its on the discretion of a union to waive an individual employee's con-
tract entitlements, not on the ability to waive statutory rights. 6 A
union's power to waive an employee's access to a neutral forum in
which to resolve disputes over statutory entitlements is distinct from
the ability to waive contract entitlements.5 7 The waiver of contract
entitlements is integral to the system of private ordering. The exclu-
sive control held by bargaining unit representatives over the forma-
50. Id. at 368.
51. 460 U.S. 693 (1983); see Comment, Deferral Policy, supra note 8, at 368-69.
52. See Comment, Deferral Policy, supra note 8, at 368-69.
53. 465 U.S. 822, 841-47 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 1, at 316 nn.417-19.
55. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975) ("[The rights guaranteed by Section 7] are, for the most part, collective rights, rights to
act in concert with one's fellow employees; they are protected not for their own sake but as an
instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife 'by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining.' ") (citation omitted).
56. See Lynchsupra note 1, at 296-97.
57. See id. at 315-16.
[Vol. 44:617
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tion and administration of collective agreements contributes to
cohesion within bargaining units and to the capacity of unions and
management to deal with problems as they arise. In contrast, union
control over employee statutory rights through private ordering
requires the scope of the collective's power to be determined in light
of statutory policies that involve more than simple deference to pri-
vate ordering. 8 Instead, the policies underlying the protection of an
employee who chooses to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid
and protection should be considered in evaluating a union's justifica-
tion for settling an employee's statutory claim in order to benefit the
bargaining unit as a whole.
When an employee who is dissatisfied with a union's decision
over a contract entitlement dispute turns to a forum outside the sys-
tem of private ordering and questions the substantive judgment of the
union, the courts have no statutory theory of internal union decision-
making against which to assess the substantive judgment of the
union.59 Therefore, courts tend to avoid second guessing the sub-
stance of union decisions regarding entitlements derived from private
ordering; instead, they restrict their inquiry to the union's motives
and whether the union made a considered decision.6° In contrast,
when an employee goes to the Board with a claim that individual stat-
utory rights have been violated, the employee is invoking a set of iden-
tifiable policies that underlie and reinforce the system of private
ordering. If the union has paid inadequate attention to these policies
or sacrificed them in order to foster other collective interests, the
charge should not be deferred without considering the merits of the
employee's statutory claim;6' the policies underlying exclusive repre-
sentation will not be undermined because the source of the employee's
statutory right is independent of the system of priyate ordering.
Moreover, access to public forums provides a check on collective
58. See id. at 334-37.
59. See Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective
Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1983) (maintaining that there is no general rule of distributive
or procedural fairness that a court can employ to overrule the discretionary decisions made by
a union in bargaining for its constituents); Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, A Reply to Hyde, Can
Judges Identify Fair Bargaining Procedures?, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (1984); Hyde, Can
Judges Identify Fair Bargaining Procedures?.- A Comment on Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 415 (1984).
60. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 296-97 (discussing the legal standard for a breach of the
duty of fair representation).
61. See Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986) (The court expressed
concern over bipartite proceedings under collective bargaining agreements where the grievance
arbitration board is composed of 50% representatives of management and 50% representatives
of labor with no neutral representative and this board resolves employee claims to a statutory
right where "individual rights may be negotiated away in the interest of the collective good.").
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power based on substantive policies derived from statutory rights and
obligations. 62 Thus, the Board should not defer to a settlement
reached between a union and an employer over the objection of the
affected employees without first addressing whether the settlement
sacrifices policies aimed at protecting the activity in question.63
IV. MANAGEMENT ENTITLEMENTS AND ARBITRATION
Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting6 and Successorship Doc-
trine 65 analyze arbitral awards that deal with subcontracting and suc-
cessorship issues. The two Comments provide useful illustrations of
the relationship between Board and court doctrine on the one hand,
and arbitral reasoning on the other. Although both subcontracting
and successorship disputes present union challenges to
entrepreneurial control, both the Board and the courts treat subcon-
62. This conclusion is different from the one arrived at by the student author of the
Comment. Compare Lynch, supra note 1, at 327-34 with Comment, Deferral Policy, supra note
8.
63. Implicit in this argument is an issue as to why a union should be permitted to waive an
individual employee's Section 7 rights through collective bargaining without the Board
questioning whether the waiver is consistent with statutory policy if the Board does not defer
to waiver of the same right when the union agrees to settle an unfair labor practice charge in
the context of a specific dispute. To permit contractual waivers while opposing deferral to
union waivers (settlements) in specific disputes appears to be inconsistent. Of course, some
employee statutory rights that are representational reinforcing may not be waived. See Lynch,
supra note 1, at 296 nn.313-14. Which rights should be treated as nonwaivable by a union is a
difficult issue not addressed here. The crux of the argument made here is to explain why a
union may waive a statutory right through a collective bargaining agreement, but not through
the settlement of a specific dispute.
Waivers in collective bargaining agreements are much more visible to all union members
than are waivers in grievance negotiations. As long as the statutory requirement that contract
waivers be "clear and unmistakable" is enforced, the membership will be aware of the waiver
when they read the agreement. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708
(1983). Thus, contractual waivers of Section 7 rights will have to be justified to affected
employees by the union in the light of what the bargaining unit obtained in exchange. If a
majority of the bargaining unit members opposes the waiver, it is not likely to be included in
an agreement. In addition, permitting the parties to define the scope of employee protections
by agreement can increase predictability between the parties regarding protected employee
activity when Board decisions are unclear regarding the scope of protected employee actions
under Section 7. It is imperative, however, that the validity of the waiver be decided by the
Board and not by an arbitrator in order to avoid the erosion of the requirement of a clear and
unmistakable waiver.
The bargaining unit's membership is not in as good a position to police the settlements of
individual employees' unfair labor practice charges. In addition, the members are not
adversely affected by the waiver of a specific employee's statutory rights in the same way that
they are affected when the agreement waives a statutory right of all unit members. Thus, the
Board should look more closely at the settlement of a charge when the affected employee
objects and not simply defer to the settlement between the union and the employer.
64. See Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 4.
65. Comment, Successorship Doctrine, supra note 4.
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tracting differently from the sale of a business. Management's discre-
tion to sell a business for any reason is much more protected from
union pressure than are subcontracting decisions. The decision to sell
is a permissive subject of bargaining; contract clauses which obligate
an employer to sell only to a purchaser who will recognize the union
and who will agree to be bound by the collective bargaining agree-
ment are given little effect by courts, other than to force the seller to
arbitrate.66 The core value informing judicial decisions dealing with
successorship clauses is the protection of capital mobility.67
In contrast, subcontracting is generally treated as a mandatory
subject of bargaining. 68 The parties are encouraged to bargain over
the subject by incorporating a clause which defines limitations on the
employer's discretion to subcontract unit work. 69 Recent Board doc-
trine, however, takes a strong management rights position and sug-
gests that it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to
subcontract unit work while an agreement is in effect unless either the
employer fails to bargain prior to subcontracting or there is an explicit
clause in the agreement restricting employer discretion. 70 The under-
lying policy seeks to protect a union's bargaining entitlement regard-
ing decisions that influence job security when the principal factor in
the subcontracting decision is the cost of labor, but the policy other-
wise seeks to conserve management's discretion to act unilaterally,
even during the term of an agreement.7'
The Board's shift toward a stronger management rights position
appears to have had little impact on the reasoning of arbitrators in
disputes over subcontracting.7 2 By comparison, court decisions estab-
lishing the statutory and contract obligations of sellers and purchasers
have played a substantial role in arbitrations over the breach of a con-
tract clause that obligates an employer to sell or assign its business
only to a successor who will assume the collective bargaining agree-
ment.73 Differences in the way the parties' relationship influences
arbitral reasoning in each type of dispute seem to account for the
66. See id. at 411-17.
67. See id. at 413-17.
68. See Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 4, at 376-78.
69. See id. at 372 & n.8.
70. See id. at 385; see also Lynch, supra note 1, at 276-84.
71. See Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 4, at 381-85.
72. See id. at 386 n. 105 (describing the way in which arbitrators cite to court opinions to
demonstrate the importance of subcontracting while paying little attention to Board opinions
as precedent for a strong management rights position).
73. See Comment, Successorship Doctrine, supra note 4, at 420-36 (describing the way in
which arbitrators use court doctrine to determine if a purchaser is a successor within the
meaning of a collective bargaining agreement's successor clause).
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varying impact of the two types of public law decisions. Subcontract-
ing disputes, which arise during the terms of collective agreements,
normally do not involve a complete breakdown in the ongoing rela-
tionship between the parties. In comparison, an arbitration involving
the seller of a business normally occurs in the midst of a breakdown,
so that unless a union is able to compel arbitration prior to the com-
pletion of the sale, the seller's former employees will either be work-
ing for the purchaser or seeking other employment. Arbitrations
involving purchasers, however, occur when a union is seeking to
establish a new workplace relationship with the purchaser. In each of
the three arbitration settings, the impact of public law doctrine varies.
Arbitrations over subcontracting usually involve a normal type
of arbitration setting because they occur in the context of an ongoing
relationship. As neutral adjudicators selected by both parties, most
arbitrators are willing to imply some constraints on subcontracting
even when a contract is silent. Moreover, the process of selecting
arbitrators makes it unlikely that an arbitrator would adopt a strong
management rights position as the starting point for resolving a sub-
contracting dispute. Unions simply are not going to select an arbitra-
tor who is known for approaching a subcontracting dispute from the
type of general rule that the Board set forth in Milwaukee Spring Divi-
sion of Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring 11). 74 In order to be
acceptable to both parties, arbitrators therefore tend to justify their
decisions by reference to the parties' understanding." They will thus
assume that the wage and recognition clauses embody some implied
limits on subcontracting when employees are on layoff or when
employees would be laid off due to the subcontracting. v6 When arbi-
trators seek to resolve disputes within the bounds of the parties' rela-
tionship, their reasoning inevitably looks more like the dissent's
opinion in Milwaukee Spring 11.7
This does not suggest that the same concerns that led the Board
to take a strong management rights position do not influence arbitra-
tors. As Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting demonstrates, arbitra-
tors are quite sensitive to employer arguments that justify
74. Milwaukee Spring Div. of I11. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee
Spring H) (Unless there is an explicit clause in the collective bargaining agreement restricting
transfers of bargaining unit work, an employer is free to transfer such work during the term of
an agreement after bargaining to impasse.), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
75. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 328-29.
76. See Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 4, at 386-89
(analyzing the factors that arbitrators consider in establishing implied contract limits on
management's discretion to subcontract bargaining unit work).
77. See Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 605-12 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
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subcontracting based on claims of efficiency or the need to reorganize
production methods in order to reduce costs.78 Moreover, manage-
ment, like unions, will not select arbitrators who have failed to give
substantial weight to efficiency considerations when justifying their
awards. What the Comment does show is the way in which arbitra-
tors reason from principles that occupy a middle ground acceptable to
both parties and then resolve specific cases by balancing a set of fac-
tors that include the parties' working relationship, the contract lan-
guage, and past practices.79
In contrast, an arbitration against the seller of a business for
breach of a successor clause involves a totally different set of circum-
stances. Once the arbitration ends, there will not normally be any
ongoing relationship between the parties to the dispute. In this type
of dispute, the arbitrator is not part of a system of private ordering
structured to help the parties maintain productivity while resolving
their problems. Instead, the arbitrator is more like a judge who deals
with the problem of allocating damages after a total breakdown in a
contractual relationship. It is not surprising that arbitrators in this
situation turn to Board and court decisions, as well as former arbitra-
tion opinons dealing with similar disputes between other parties, to
provide the principles that justify their awards.8"
Federal common law concerned with enforcing collective bar-
gaining agreements against successors protects capital mobility by
refusing to bind a successor to the seller's collective agreement.8'
Board doctrine is equally protective of a successor's discretion to set
wages and working conditions, except for the obligation to bargain
with the union if a majority of the successor's employees were
employees of the seller.82 Arbitrators, in turn, rely on the definition of
a successor under these two bodies of law in order to interpret succes-
sor clauses narrowly. To prevail, a union must show that the parties
understood the implications of the clause when they agreed to restrict
the management's discretion to sell the company only to a purchaser
who would assume any existing collective agreement.8 3 Even if a
union does prevail, however, the arbitrator may be hesitant to award
substantial damages to the union.
In addition, because arbitrators rely heavily on court doctrine
and Board decisions in this area, courts are more likely to review
78. See Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting, supra note 4, at 390-91.
79. Id. at 386-89.
80. See Comment, Successorship Doctrine, supra note 4, at 436-38.
81. See id. at 413-16.
82. See id. at 407-10, 413 n.69.
83. See, e.g., id. at 420-28.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
awards closely for any error of law in the way in which arbitrators
apply public law doctrine to interpret the parties' agreement.84 Arbi-
trators know that a meaningful remedy awarded to a union will be
challenged in court by the employer. There is less justification for
courts to be deferential to arbitrators when the parties no longer have
ongoing working relationships. Therefore, this threat of a higher
standard of judicial review encourages arbitrators to adopt the princi-
ples underlying the successor doctrine that are embodied in federal
common law.
In the third context, arbitrations against successors, the parties
are in the process of establishing a relationship. This type of arbitra-
tion would not normally occur unless a successor voluntarily submit-
ted to an arbitrator's jurisdiction; federal courts will rarely compel a
successor to arbitrate.85 Thus, arbitration will only occur if the new
employer is seeking to use arbitration in order to resolve a problem
that has its origins in the employees' relationship with their former
employer. The successor, however, would not be using arbitration to
deal with the problem unless it had retained at least a substantial seg-
ment of the predecessor's employees and wished to resolve a problem
grounded in the predecessor's agreement, or it had assumed that
agreement. Consequently, the arbitrator is again in a normal setting,
dealing with the formation of a new ongoing relationship. The arbi-
trator will tend to interpret obligations arising out of the former
agreement from a perspective that strikes a balance between vested
employee expectations and the successor's freedom to establish new
working conditions. In this situation, principles of public law succes-
sor doctrine play less of a role than they would in arbitrations against
predecessors due to the change in the contextual nature of the
dispute.86
In summary, the two Comments demonstrate that arbitrators
share the tendency of the Board and the courts to protect economic
efficiency and capital mobility. Arbitrators also tend, however, to
avoid strong management rights positions as the starting place for
their reasoning if the arbitration is part of an ongoing process of dis-
pute resolution within a particular bargaining unit. Instead, they rea-
son from principles which occupy the middle ground between labor
and management. As the context of arbitration changes and arbitra-
tors occupy a position more like that of judges confronted with a
84. See, e.g., Hardin's Bakery, Inc. v. United Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union,
Local 441, 877 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1989).
85. Compare Comment, Successorship Doctrine, supra note 4, at 405-07 with id. at 411-12.
86. See id. at 428-36.
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breakdown in the relationship between parties, there is increased reli-
ance on public law doctrine.
Given the recent developments in Board and court doctrine in
favor of a strong management rights position, unions may well find
arbitration a more favorable forum for disputes over work preserva-
tion than the Board or the courts. Arbitrators share values similar to
those of judges and Board members, and they may thus rule the same
way; an arbitrator, however, is more likely to approach the dispute
with an assumption of implied limits on management rights than is
the NLRB.87 Nonetheless, when public law doctrine does influence
an arbitrator's interpretation of an agreement, such as when a succes-
sor clause is involved, the arbitrator normally does not challenge the
substance of that doctrine because of the heightened standards of judi-
cial review."8 Thus, unions face a tension between selecting an arbi-
tral forum that is more likely to rule in their favor in a specific work
preservation dispute, and a public forum where they can seek incre-
mental changes in the legal framework governing collective bargain-
ing through the processing of disputes that raise questions about the
assumptions underlying the framework.
V. EMPLOYEE STATUTORY ENTITLEMENTS AND ARBITRATION
Selective Discipline,9 which analyzed the validity of more severe
sanctions for union leaders, and Weingarten Right,9° which examined
an employee's right to have a union representative present at a disci-
plinary interview, provide additional examples of the way that a
forum's context influences outcomes. In both areas, the NLRB and
the courts have historically struggled with inherent tensions among
statutory values as they have formulated the scope of statutory pro-
tections for union officials fulfilling their leadership roles. They have
also struggled to define the statutory right of employees to demand
procedural due process protections in disciplinary interviews.
Because disputes in both areas are common, the Board needed to
develop guidelines that would provide some predictability with regard
to the respective statutory rights and obligations of labor and
management.
In contrast, arbitrators are concerned primarily with predictabil-
ity between the parties to a specific agreement. Arbitrators approach
the discipline of union leaders from the perspective of whether there
87. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 328-31.
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89. Comment, Selective Discipline, supra note 4.
90. Comment, Weingarten Right, supra note 4.
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was "just cause" for the discipline under the specific circumstances.
In the context of a given situation, an arbitrator will balance the need
for employer control over workplace discipline and the integrity of
contract obligations against the obligation of the employer to treat
employees equally. 91 Similarly, in disputes over employer investiga-
tory interviews, arbitrators balance the employer's need to learn the
facts of an incident against the need to maintain procedures that
would promote employee perceptions of fairness and due process in
the way discipline is determined. 92 As the Board and the courts
refined the statutory scope of these Section 7 entitlements, arbitrators
adjusted their approach to accommodate the changes, but they
filtered the impact of these changes by making them an integral part
of the parties' expectations.
For example, both the Board and arbitrators initially upheld the
right of an employer to sanction a union official more severely than
other employees committing the same basic offense.93 In its decisions,
however, the Board struggled with the tension between protecting the
internal political autonomy of unions to decide how their leaders
should deal with work stoppages in violation of no-strike clauses, and
enhancing industrial peace by encouraging union leaders, under the
threat of discipline by the employer, to protect the integrity of no-
strike pledges. 94 As the Board's decisions evolved toward a general
rule that was more protective of union autonomy, the Supreme Court
issued a ruling in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,95 that mediated
the conflict between the two policies. The Court affirmed the Board's
effort to protect union autonomy by granting union officials an entitle-
ment not to be differentially sanctioned, but at the same time it used
the contractual nature of the parties' relationship to highlight the abil-
ity of management to purchase a contract entitlement allowing it to
differentially sanction union officials. 96
In its analysis of arbitral awards in disputes involving differential
sanctions, Selective Discipline demonstrates the way in which the
traditional concern of arbitrators with maintaining productivity, man-
agement's right to run its business, the integrity of the parties' bar-
91. Arbitrators normally strike this balance in favor of maintaining productivity. See infra
note 97 and accompanying text.
92. Because following fair investigative procedures ultimately provided benefits for
management by controlling supervisors conducting investigations and for employees by
assuring fair procedures, arbitrators read the essential requirements of procedural due process
into the meaning of just cause. See infra note 104.
93. See Comment, Selective Discipline, supra note 4, at 449-50 nn.34-38.
94. See id.
95. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
96. Id. at 704-07; see Comment, Selective Discipline, supra note 4, at 444-45.
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gain, and deference to accepted industrial practices has led most
arbitrators to uphold more severe sanctions for union leaders.97
Union autonomy within a specific bargaining unit in which the union
was already strong enough to confront management by violating a no-
strike clause was not a major concern of arbitrators. Once the
Supreme Court settled the statutory entitlement with its decision in
Metropolitan Edison, arbitrators adjusted. They simply made the
union leaders' entitlement not to be more severely sanctioned the
starting point for their analysis. Thus, the focus of arbitrators shifted
from determining whether the entitlement existed to interpreting the
contract and bargaining history in light of traditional concerns in
order to determine if the entitlement had been waived through a no-
strike clause.9"
The Comment concluded that the contractual definition of the
scope of the protection for union leaders makes arbitration the appro-
priate forum in which to resolve these disputes because the outcome
will turn on the language of the contract and the understanding of the
parties within each bargaining unit, as well as because keeping the
disputes within specific bargaining units will reinforce industrial self-
government.99 My conclusions are to the contrary."° In order to
protect the statutory policy of union autonomy, disputes over the
waiver of the entitlement in the collective bargaining agreement
should not be deferred to arbitration, but should instead be deter-
mined by the NLRB. 10 1 Arbitrators are less likely than the Board to
apply the Metropolitan Edison standard of an explicit waiver because
the requirement of an explicit waiver reflects a set of policy concerns
that are external to the working relationships of the parties. Arbitra-
tors are more likely to emphasize concerns internal to the bargaining
unit when they interpret the agreement in order to decide the waiver
issue. The statutory policy of protecting internal union autonomy is
less central to an arbitrator's reasoning than it is to the reasoning of
the NLRB. 10 2
In contrast, Weingarten Right illustrated how the characteristics
of arbitration could lead to an outcome more favorable to an individ-
ual employee seeking to invoke a Section 7 statutory entitlement than
would be the case if the issue were resolved before the NLRB.'03 In
97. See Comment, Selective Discipline, supra note 4, at 453-59.
98. See id. at 461-62.
99. See id. at 465-66.
100. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 334-39.
101. See id. at 335-36.
102. See id.
103. Compare Comment, Weingarten Right, supra note 4, at 477-80 with id. at 482-87.
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confronting what constitutes just cause, arbitrators tend to avoid sec-
ond guessing the substance of management's decision to discipline,
other than to ask whether the discipline was too severe given the
nature of the rule violation. Instead, arbitrators focus on whether the
rule was reasonable, whether employees were aware of the rule, and
whether the investigation was fair. " These principles are aimed at
correcting the way in which supervisors proceed in deciding whether
to discipline so that the eventual decisions are more likely to be
accepted by employees as fair under the circumstances. An
employee's right to have a union official present during an investiga-
tory interview is a logical extension of these concerns. Employees are
more likely to accept the investigative process as fair if their represen-
tative is present. Moreover, the union is informed so that subsequent
grievance procedures are more likely to resolve the dispute short of
arbitration, and the presence of the union representative helps to
assure that the supervisor conducting the investigation will proceed in
accordance with accepted procedures.
Arbitrators initially struggled with the tension between deterring
employee insubordination in the context of a disciplinary investiga-
tion and ensuring industrial due process.I 5 Once the Supreme Court
found the entitlement in Section 7,106 arbitrators were more willing
than the NLRB to grant a meaningful remedy to protect the entitle-
ment. 10 7 Because the Board now limits its remedy to ordering an
employer to cease and desist from refusing union representation at
disciplinary interviews-unless the employee was disciplined for
insubordination based on the employee's demand that a union repre-
sentative be present during the interview-rather than ordering rein-
statement and back pay for the employee whose procedural rights
were violated, there is an incentive for unions to arbitrate these dis-
104. The traditional questions arbitrators ask in determining just cause for discipline are:
(1) Did the company warn employees of the rule and possible discipline for its violation? (2) Is
the rule reasonably related to the safe and efficient operation of the business? (3) Did
management investigate the rule violation before deciding to discipline the employee? (4) Was
the investigation fair and objective? (5) Was there sufficient evidence of the rule violation at the
time management made the decision to discipline? (6) Has the rule been applied in an even-
handed way to all employees? (7) Was the discipline that was administered reasonable in light
of the rule violation and the employee's work record? See Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.). The American Arbitration Association has
accepted Arbitrator Daugherty's tests for determining just cause in discipline cases. See
Indianapolis Rubber Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 529, 534 (1982) (Gibson, Arb.).
105. See Comment, Weingarten Right, supra note 4, at 470-76.
106. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
107. For a description of the evolution of Board remedies subsequent to the Court's
decision in Weingarten, see Comment, Weingarten Right, supra note 4, at 477-79. For arbitral
remedies after Weingarten, see id. at 482-87.
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putes instead of taking them to the Board. "' In contrast, an arbitrator
is more likely to seek a middle ground between the procedural viola-
tion and the underlying basis for discipline by giving the employee a
limited remedy such as reinstatement without back pay. 9
Given that arbitrators will tend to examine carefully the relation-
ship between the decision to discipline and the Weingarten violation, a
union that files an unfair labor practice charge over a Weingarten vio-
lation is seeking Board intervention for reasons that go beyond the
dispute over discipline. If a regional director finds an evidentiary
basis for the charge, deferral is inappropriate.110 The dispute before
the Board is really over the empowerment of workers reflected in their
right to have a union representative present during the interview and
protecting the union's voice in disciplinary procedures. Arbitration is
an appropriate forum to challenge the discipline, but not to redress
the statutory charges. Therefore, the NLRB should not defer a Wein-
garten-based unfair labor practice charge on the grounds that the
union may challenge disciplinary just cause in arbitration.
VI. UNSETTLED ENTITLEMENTS IN ARBITRATION
Drug Testing' 1 compared the reasoning of arbitrators in dis-
putes over employer-imposed drug testing programs with fourth
amendment jurisprudence resolving disputes over drug testing by
public employers. Drug testing was selected as a topic for study
because it illustrates how arbitrators deal with unsettled entitlements
that the parties often do not discuss during bargaining and that collec-
tive bargaining agreements do not address. 112 In most controversies
over management's discretion to unilaterally implement a drug testing
program under a management rights clause, the arbitrator weighs
management's right to impose reasonable workplace rules to foster
productivity and to protect job safety against the employees' privacy
interests and normal entitlement not to have employers regulate off-
the-job conduct unrelated to job performance. 1 3
Drug testing presents an interesting dilemma for arbitrators. If
they justify their awards within the normal parameters of arbitral rea-
soning, the central issues will be whether the employer had reasonable
suspicion to believe that the tested employee was under the influence
108. See id. at 477-79, 482-87.
109. See id. at 485-87.
110. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 335-36 (proposing a standard for deferral that would not
include the deferral of a Weingarten violation).
111. See Comment, Drug Testing, supra note 4.
112. For a discussion of drug testing as an unsettled entitlement, see id. at 489-90.
113. See id. at 532-36.
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of drugs, whether there was an accident or other work related inci-
dent that would justify testing in the absence of individualized suspi-
cion, and whether the employer can produce evidence of substantial
interference with productivity or job safety thereby justifying the test-
ing of all employees irrespective of individual suspicion.114 Under
these traditional parameters, however, it would be difficult for an arbi-
trator to uphold a testing program aimed at demonstrating to the
public that the employees in question are not using drugs.
Determining the reasonableness of the rule in terms of job safety,
productivity, and individualized suspicion fits within the normal
framework for examining just cause for discipline." 5 Random testing
and programs designed to test all employees at the time of an annual
physical, however, do not fit within this framework. In these circum-
stances, the dispute is not over the testing and discipline of a specific
employee; instead, the dispute is over a program of testing that will
intrude on the privacy of all employees and that will condition their
continued employment on the way in which they spend their free
time. In arbitration, an employer would normally have to make a
substantial showing of the relationship between the drug testing rule
and concerns over productivity and safety in the particular bargaining
unit before the testing program would be upheld as a reasonable exer-
cise of management's rights. 16 In contrast, fourth amendment juris-
prudence permits drug testing without individualized suspicion under
a balancing test: "In limited circumstances, where the privacy inter-
ests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important
governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may
be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. ' 17 The Com-
ment explored the impact of the fourth amendment balancing test on
the normal "job-related" test of arbitrators and concluded that the
constitutional decisions of the federal courts are having a major
impact on the reasoning of arbitrators."'
For example, the types of industries where arbitrators have
upheld testing, not based on individualized suspicion, directly parallel
the categories where federal courts have permitted similar testing.'
These categories include highly regulated industries reflecting general
societal concerns over the product or service and industries or services
114. See id. at 523-25.
115. For the framework used by arbitrators to determine just cause, see supra note 104.
116. See, e.g., Comment, Drug Testing, supra note 4, at 525-29.
117. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1417 (1989).
118. See Comment, Drug Testing, supra note 4, at 535-38.
119. See id. at 525-29.
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which pose a threat to the safety of persons or property. 120 This par-
allel result is not surprising because arbitrators tend to incorporate
broader based societal values into their notions of industrial justice, a
process of incorporation which is aptly illustrated by the integration
of procedural due process concepts into the definition of "just
cause." 12 1 We can expect, therefore, that the scope of testing by pub-
lic employers that is held to be permissible under the fourth amend-
ment will be found to be a reasonable exercise of management rights
by arbitrators unless unions and employers agree on programs that
are more limiting. 22
There is, however, one type of justification for drug testing which
courts have accepted but which arbitrators may view with more
skepticism. Following National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Rabb, 23 courts are using three principal justifications for testing: (a)
safety to fellow employees and the public; 24 (b) access to sensitive
information; 25 and (c) public acceptance of the integrity of the
workforce.' 26 The first two justifications are consistent with the type
120. See id. at 525-28.
121. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
122. A union may also agree with a private employer to allow a drug testing program that
goes further than would be permitted in the testing of public employees under the fourth
amendment, such as a program that randomly tests employees in an industry that is not highly
regulated and that does not threaten the safety of third persons. One interesting issue not yet
addressed in the public sector cases is whether unions may waive individual employees' fourth
amendment rights by agreeing to drug testing plans that go further in testing than would have
been permitted under court decisions interpreting the fourth amendment. The protection of
individual statutory rights independent of the NLRA from a collective waiver would suggest
that individual constitutional rights cannot be waived by unions. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note
1, at 315-16.
123. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
124. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The
court relied on National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1984 (1989), and
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), to uphold random
testing of civilian employees of the Army, who were engaged in some aspect of aviation, on the
ground of safety. Cheney, 884 F.2d at 610-11. The court also upheld the random testing of
armed law enforcement personnel on the same grounds. Id. at 612-13. In the case of civilian
employees engaged in chemical and nuclear safety positions, the court remanded for additional
evidence on the tasks of different groups of employees in order to determine if the testing was
reasonably based on a safety justification. Id. at 611; see also Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878
F.2d 484, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (accepting public safety as a legitimate governmental interest to
justify drug testing, but rejecting its application to Justice Department personnel who are not
armed); Comment, Drug Testing, supra note 4, at 504-09.
125. See Harmon, 878 F.2d at 490-91 (Relying on Von Raab, the court accepted access to
"truly sensitive" information as a justification for the random testing of persons with access to
top secret national security information, but it also stated that not all federal prosecutors with
access to grand jury proceedings fall within that class.); Comment, Drug Testing, supra note 4,
at 504-08.
126. See Cheney, 884 F.2d at 613-15 (The court accepted the need for integrity and
confidence in the employee as a justification for the Army to randomly test civilian drug
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of issues an arbitrator would normally consider under a management
rights clause.1 27 The integrity issue, however, is more closely linked
to the nature of a government service than to the nature of a privately
provided service. Without some evidence to demonstrate that drug
use does in fact impact on the quality of an employer's product, arbi-
trators may be less inclined than courts to accept testing based solely
on the claim that the public must have confidence in the employees
who perform certain tasks, such as customs officials involved in drug
interdiction, 28 drug counselors, 29 or justice department attorneys
trying drug cases.' 30
If arbitrators do define the scope of an employer's entitlement so
that the employer may unilaterally impose testing consistent with
fourth amendment jurisprudence, unions will have a difficult time bar-
gaining for contract clauses that are more protective of employee pri-
vacy rights. Drug testing is not an issue about which employees share
a common view. Some employees will strongly object to annual or
random testing, while others may have a distinctly different view that
is more influenced by overriding societal concerns about eradicating
drug use. Given this potential for disparate views among employees,
it is unlikely that a union would strike in opposition to a proposed
testing program that has been accepted by the courts for public sector
employees. Moreover, unions will feel pressured to agree to what the
federal courts have found to be permissible under the fourth amend-
ment because arbitrators are likely to follow the courts' lead in setting
entitlements in the area of drug testing. Consequently, the decisions
of federal courts and arbitrators are likely to determine the scope of
drug testing, rather than collective bargaining.
counselors, but not laboratory workers or persons who handle testing specimens in the chain of
custody.); Harmon, 878 F.2d at 490-91 (Relying on Von Raab, the court accepted integrity as
a justification for random testing in some circumstances and conceded, arguendo, that the
justification would apply to Justice Department prosecutors with substantial responsibility for
the prosecution of drug offenders, but not to all prosecutors.); Comment, Drug Testing, supra
note 4, at 503-06.
127. See Comment, Drug Testing, supra note 4, at 520-28 (analyzing the factors that
arbitrators consider in deciding if testing is reasonable in the context of a specific bargaining
unit).
128. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397-98 (allowing testing of customs officials involved in
drug interdiction).
129. See Cheney, 884 F.2d at 614 (permitting random testing of drug counselors).
130. See Harmon, 878 F.2d at 490 ("It seems quite possible that the Department might
constitutionally fashion a random drug testing program for all DOJ [Department of Justice]





There are two patterns which emerge from the student Com-
ments in this Special Topics issue. First, when a union is challenging
the scope of an employer's entitlement because there is a gap in a
collective bargaining agreement or a clause limiting management dis-
cretion, the union is more likely to obtain a favorable outcome from
arbitration than from the Board because recent Board and court opin-
ions have taken a strong managment rights position. 3' Arbitrators,
on the other hand, tend to analyze such disputes in the light of princi-
ples that incorporate implied limits on management rights. In con-
trast, when a dispute involves the claim of an employee statutory right
under Section 7, the employee is more likely to obtain a favorable
result before the Board than before an arbitrator if the statutory pol-
icy supporting the right is not incorporated as a matter of course
within arbitral values. For example, although the protection of union
autonomy is not a value that is integral to the system of administering
collective bargaining agreements, fair procedures in the conduct of
disciplinary investigations are an integral part of that system.
32
These observations on the strategic forum shopping choices of
unions are conditioned by recent substantive doctrinal developments
favoring managerial discretion and control over the workplace under
Board and court law. If Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil
Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring I) 3 were still the Board's position or
if the Board had not retreated from the original reinstatement remedy
for Weingarten violations,' 34 the most likely forum for a favorable
union result would be the Board and not an arbitrator. The more
Board and court doctrines favor employers, however, the more likely
it will be that unions will turn to arbitrators to resolve workplace dis-
putes involving both statutory and contract entitlements. Although a
union's decision to arbitrate may be rational in the context of a spe-
cific dispute, the consequence of turning to arbitration is that public
law doctrines favoring management will be reinforced. Arbitrators
reason in the shadow of these doctrines, and, as an integral part of the
system of dispute processing under collective bargaining agreements,
arbitrators are not in a position to challenge the underlying assump-
tions of the governing legal framework.' 35 Thus, unions turn away
131. See supra notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 89-110 and accompanying text.
133. 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982), rev'd on reh'g, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring
II), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
134. See Weingarten Right, supra note 4, at 477-78.
135. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 327-31.
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from seeking a more favorable set of legal principles to govern the
structure of collective bargaining and instead focus their efforts on
specific gains through negotiations and dispute processing within par-
ticular bargaining units. The potential contribution of dispute
processing to incremental changes in the ideology governing work-
place relationships is bifurcated and limited in its impact. 136
These observations support my argument that the Board should
narrow the deferral doctrine. 3 7 If a union makes the choice to take a
dispute to the Board in addition to, or in lieu of, arbitration, the union
seeks to resolve the dispute in light of policies embodied in the
NLRA. The union's goal is to encourage policies that foster solidar-
ity among workers and that enhance the capacity of unions to mobil-
ize support across bargaining unit lines for shared concerns of
employees. These policies are external to particularized systems of
private ordering. As long as a union has an arguable claim that issues
of statutory policy are implicated in a dispute, the employer should
not have the option to avoid confronting the policy issues by
obtaining deferral to arbitration. Otherwise, the disputes and the
implications of the way in which the disputes are resolved are sub-
merged within the system of private ordering. The value conflicts
implicit in the disputes become less visible and are not subjected to
public debate over the scope of workers' rights. The free contract
ideology underlying private ordering should not be used to justify the
resolution of disputes over statutory policy by arbitrators who make
decisions in accordance with their assumptions about the appropriate
status relationship between employees and management.
136. See id. at 337-39.
137. See id. at 334-39.
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